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Millions of email users around the world face the same problem each time they go 
to check their email inbox - Spam.  Every day, millions of spam emails are sent.  In 
response to the ever-growing spam problem, Congress enacted the Controlling the 
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketings Act of 2003 (hereinafter “CAN-
SPAM”)1. Due to the relative youth of CAN-SPAM, no court in the nation had evaluated 
any portion of the statute until White Buffalo Ventures v. University of Texas2 was heard 
in the Fifth Circuit.  While I[HM2] ultimately agree with the holding of the Court of 
Appeals, this Note aims to further clarify the holding of the Court, and give better 
guidance for the future.  Part I describes the genesis of spam legislation up until CAN-
SPAM’s enactment.  Part II sets out the factual and procedural background of White 
Buffalo and details the Fifth Circuit’s holding.  Part III argues that the while holding is 
correct, much of the analysis explaining the holding is missing.  Finally, based on these 
reasons, Part IV suggests guidelines for the future. 
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2I. Background. 
A. The Very Beginning[HM3].
A better understanding of the ascendancy of “spam” requires a brief background 
on the history of email.  Email began as a way for colleagues to communicate amongst 
each other.3 A pioneer of email described it as “a system for communication among 
colleagues, and your colleagues weren’t about to bother you with stuff like spam.”4
However, the function of email was forever changed on May 3, 1978 when Gary Thuerk, 
a marketing manager, sent out the first piece of spam in an effort to advertise his 
company’s open house.  Even from its inception, spam was met with hostility.  Thuerk 
received angry emails, calling his message “a clear and flagrant abuse.”5 Thuerk was 
reprimanded and instructed not to send such messages again.  This reprimand proved 
effective and seemed to thwart other spammers from sending similar messages, at least 
for the time being.6
In 1994, Laurence Canter and Martha Siegel used Internet bulletin boards to send 
spam to millions of people.7 The response was much harsher; Canter and Siegel were cut 
off from their Internet provider and “widely chastised.”8 However, unlike Thuerk, Canter 
and Siegel were decidedly less apologetic.  Their response was, “Get used to it, because 
we’re going to do it again.”9 And with this brazenness, an era of mass commercial emails 
 
3 David Streitfeld, Opening Pandora’s In - Box, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2003, at 1.  
4 Id (quoting Ray Tomlinson).
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 An Internet bulletin board, also called bulletin board systems (or BBS), provides an electronic database, 
the contents of which are controlled by a system operator.  Users can log in to leave messages, browse 
archived files, and perform a number of other functions that the system operator chooses.  Dictionary.com, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=bulletin%20board%20system (last visited January 16, 2006). 
8 Streitfeld, supra note 2, at 1.  
9 Id. 
3was birthed.  Cyberspace was not controlled by the government; thus, there was no one to 
prohibit spammers from sending out spam at will. 
B. The State Response. 
As Internet use soared, the volume of spam sent to email users rose accordingly 
and States began to take a more active role in controlling the types of messages sent.  In 
1997, Nevada enacted the nation’s first anti-spam law.10 The Nevada law required the 
sender to provide their legal name, complete street address, a valid return email address, 
and an “opt-out” option.11 Washington followed by passing its own anti-spam statute, 
prohibiting falsification of point of origin and subject line information.12 Shortly 
thereafter, California enacted its own statute, requiring unsolicited messages to be labeled 
as “ADV:” or “ADV:ADLT”.13 By 2003, thirty-six states had enacted spam legislation 
and two states prohibited spam altogether.14 The states sought to use the same basic 
formula, typically a combination of the basic provisions in the Nevada, Washington and 
California statutes, focusing on deceptive practices like “misleading subject lines, forged 
sender addresses, and false routing information contained in message headers.”15 Other 
features included clear labels in the header and “opt-out” options.16 However, for a 
variety of reasons, the state legislative attempts failed.  To begin with, few spammers 
complied with state requirements.  Secondly, states were often unable to prosecute under 
 
10 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.705 
11 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.730(1)(c)(i) - (ii) (revised 2001 and 2003). 
12 Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.190.020(1)(a) (1998) (repealed 1999). 
13 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.4 (1998) (repealed 2003).  The “ADV:” label would signify general 
advertisements, while the “ADV:ADLT” label would signify messages with information consisting of “the 
lease, sale, rental, gift offer, or other disposition of any realty, goods, services, or extension of credit that 
may only be viewed, purchased, rented, leased, or held in possession by an individual 18 years of age . . . .” 
14 Among the states that attempted to ban spam outright were California, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. § 
17529.2 (Westlaw 2004); and Delaware, Del. Code tit. 11, § 937 (2003). 
15 David Sorkin, Spam Legislation in the United States, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 3, 4 
(2003). 
16 Id. 
4their laws due to the high cost of tracking down spammers,17 ambiguities in the definition 
of terms in the state laws,18 and jurisdictional problems caused by the interstate nature of 
email.19 
C. The Federal Government Steps In. 
In mid-2003, aware of the failure of state legislation to curtail unsolicited 
commercial email, the Federal Trade Commission began a forum on spam to determine 
the best solution to the problem.  A collection of almost 400 “bureaucrats and lawmakers, 
consumers, lawyers, Internet service providers, techies and, most perilously, anti-spam 
activists and spammers” sat down for several days to discuss ways of curbing what was 
described as “today’s onslaught of unsolicited e-mail ads.”20 A persistent problem with 
the drafting of anti-spam legislation stems from spam’s very definition.”  Depending on 
the context, “spam” may be defined very broadly to include all forms of unsolicited 
email, very narrowly, to include only commercial emails that are deceptive and 
fraudulent, or something in between.  Congress ultimately defined spam as a 
“commercial electronic mail message” meaning “any electronic mail message the 
primary purpose of which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial 
product or service.”21 By enacting the statute, Congress largely preempted state law.22 
However, Congress also recognized that “the problems associated with the rapid growth 
and abuse of unsolicited commercial email cannot be solved by Federal legislation 
 
17 Matthew Prince and Patrick Shea, After CAN-SPAM, How States Can Stay Relevant in the Fight Against 
Unwanted Messages, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 29, 40 (2003) 
18 Id. at 43-44. 
19 Daniel Mayer, Attacking a Windmill:  Why the CAN SPAM Act is a Futile Waste of Time and Money, 31 
J. LEGIS. 177, 186 (2004). 
20 Don Oldenburg, Spam and a Case of Dyspepsia; Marketers and Blacklisters Face Off at FTC’s E-Mail 
Forum, WASH. POST, May 3, 2003, at C01. 
21 15 U.S.C.S. § 7702(2)(A) (West 2005). 
22 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707 (West 2005). 
5alone.”23 Therefore, Congress also included in the statute certain provisions that exempt 
Internet access providers[HM4],24 as well as state policies not specific to email but which 
may affect email.25 These exemptions were included to supplement CAN-SPAM and 
account for areas not covered under the legislation. 
II. White Buffalo Ventures v. University of Texas at Austin[HM5].
A. Factual Background. 
The University of Texas at Austin (“UT”) provides free Internet access and email 
address to its faculty, staff and students.26 The UT email accounts can be accessed either 
on-campus, through use of both wireless and wired connections, or remotely, through 
other Internet service providers.  White Buffalo Ventures, LLC (“White Buffalo”) 
operates several online dating services, one of which is LonghornSingles.com.[HM6] In 
February of 2003, White Buffalo submitted a Public Information Act request27 and UT 
responded by disclosing all qualifying email addresses.28 In April of 2003, White 
Buffalo began sending “legal commercial spam” to people affiliated with UT.29 A total 
of 55,000 emails promoting LonghornSingles.com were sent.30 Although the emails were 
not initially detected by spam filters,31 UT officials began to receive complaints.  The 
 
23 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701(a)(12) (West 2005). 
24 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(c) (West 2005). 
25 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(2) (West 2005). 
26 White Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. of Tex., 420 F.3d 366, 369 (5th Cir. 2005). 
27 Chapter 552 of the TX Government Code provides that all people of the state are entitled to “complete 
information about the affairs of government” and the official acts of public officials and employees.”  
“Public information” is defined in section 552.002(a) as “information that is collected, assembled, or 
maintained under a law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business:  (1) by a 
governmental body; or (2) for a governmental body and the governmental body owns the information or 
has a right of access to it.” 
28 White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 369. 
29 Id. 
30 White Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. of Tex., No. A-03-CA-296-SS, 2004 WL 1854168 at *1 (W.D.Tex. Mar. 
22, 2004), aff’d, 420 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2005). 
31 UT has developed its own commercial spam filters designed to alert the network system operators when 
a large amount of email emanates from one source. 
6University then sent White Buffalo a cease and desist letter, which was ignored.[HM7] 
Pursuant to its Regents’ Rules which block incoming, unsolicited commercial emails, UT 
responded by blocking all emails from White Buffalo’s source address to addresses 
containing the “@utexas.edu” string.32 
B. Procedural History. 
White Buffalo filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) in the 
District Court for the State of Texas to enjoin UT from blocking emails to UT students 
and the TRO was issued on May 9, 2003.33[HM8] UT subsequently removed the case to 
federal court.34 After a hearing in May 2003, the district court denied White Buffalo’s 
petition for a [HM9]preliminary injunction and both parties moved for summary 
judgment.35 In an opinion by Judge Sparks, the court granted UT summary judgment, 
holding that the university was an internet access provider and that their policy was thus 
not preempted under the CAN-SPAM Act.36 Judge Sparks also held that UT’s policy did 
not violate White Buffalo’s free speech rights.37 Finally, the district court held that the 
Board of Regents’ policy was not specific to email and instead was a general set of rules 
governing solicitation using university facilities.38 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the district court.  In reviewing the 
decision of the district court de novo,39 the Court of Appeals found that while the CAN-
 
32 White Buffalo Ventures, 2004 WL 1854168 at *1. 
33 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 7, White Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. of Tex., No. 04-50362 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 
2004),. 
34 White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 370. 
35 Id. 
36 White Buffalo Ventures, 2004 WL 1854168 at *3. 
37 Id. at *6. 
38 Id. at *3. 
39 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 provides that a grant of summary judgment shall be reviewed de novo.
7SPAM Act’s preemption clause did apply to UT, the exemption clause in § 7707 allowed 
UT to employ protective measures because of its status as an internet service provider. 
III. Analysis. 
A. Textual ambiguity and preemption. 
The first issue addressed with respect to the preemptive effect of CAN-SPAM is 
the textual ambiguity of the Act itself, which expressly preempts: 
[A]ny statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State that 
expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages, 
except to the extent that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or 
deception in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or information 
attached thereto.40 
Although CAN-SPAM itself fails to define the meaning of either “State” or “political 
subdivision of a State,”41 the word “State” is construed to encompass “other entit[ies] . . . 
that [are] created by the constitution . . ., including a university system or institution of 
higher education.”42 Therefore, UT is encompassed under the banner of “State or 
political subdivision of a State.”43 The act also provides an exemption clause, which 
states, “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to have any effect on the lawfulness or 
unlawfulness . . . of the adoption, implementation, or enforcement by a provider of 
Internet access service of a policy of declining to transmit, route, relay, handle, or store 
certain types of electronic mail messages.”44 Due to the fact that UT provides Internet 
access to its students, UT is also encompassed under the banner of “Internet access 
provider.”  CAN-SPAM gives no guidance as to which provision controls when a State or 
 
40 15 U.S.C.S. §7707(b)(1) (West 2005). 
41 See 15 U.S.C. §7702 (containing the definitions of terms under CAN-SPAM, but omitting definitions of 
either “state” or “political subdivision.”) 
42 TX GOVT §2260.001(4). 
43 15 U.S.C. §7707(b)(1). 
44 15 U.S.C. §7707(c). 
8political subdivision of a State is at the same time an Internet access provider.  The Court 
held, “The textual ambiguity triggers the strong presumption against [a finding of 
preemption].”45 However, the Court failed to explain why such a strong presumption 
exists. 
It is first important to further clarify what the Court meant when it referred to a 
“textual ambiguity.”  In the preceding paragraph, the Court discusses the two 
“competing” interpretations of CAN-SPAM:  1) that “state entities may not regulate 
commercial speech except when regulation relates to the authenticity of the speech’s 
source and content”46 vs. 2) “state entities may implement a variety of non-authenticity 
related commercial speech restrictions, provided the state entity . . . is an ‘Internet access 
provider.’”47 However, applying the plain meaning of the statute, the two theories are not 
in conflict with one another.  The exemption clause at § 7707(c) clearly states, “[n]othing 
in this chapter shall be construed to have any effect” on the legality of a policy adopted 
by an Internet access provider.48 The plain language of this clause suggests that the 
preemption clause is superseded by the exemption clause when the party implementing 
the restriction is an Internet access provider, regardless of whether such provider is a 
State agent.  However, the Court confuses this issue by stating only that the exemption 
clause “triggers the presumption against preemption.”49 In fact, this is not just a 
presumption but, in effect, a definitive preemption of the preemption clause[HM10].
If ambiguity exists at all, it is whether a state actor may ever constitute an Internet 
access provider for purposes of CAN-SPAM.  The Act defines an Internet access 
 
45 White Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. of Tex., 420 F.3d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2005). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(c) (West 2005) (emphasis added). 
49 White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 372 (emphasis added). 
9provider [HM11]as “a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic 
mail, or other services offered over the Internet, and may also include access to 
proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of services 
offered to consumers.”50 There is nothing in this definition that would exclude a State 
actor, or any other entity, from classification as an Internet service provider.  Therefore, 
the presumption exists that an entity can concurrently be considered an Internet access 
provider and a State or political subdivision of a State. 
An application of the definition of an Internet access provider to UT shows that 
the University is, in fact, an Internet access provider.  The faculty, students and staff of 
the University are able to access the Internet, including their UT email accounts, through 
both wired and wireless service on-campus.[HM12]51 Although White Buffalo cites the fact 
that only 6,000 of the 59,000 individuals with “utexas.edu” email address check their 
accounts on-campus, perhaps in an effort to illustrate that UT is not an Internet access 
provider, the Court stated, “[W]e are hard-pressed to find that providing email accounts 
and email access does not bring UT within the statutory definition . . . .”52 Absent any 
language barring a State actor from consideration as an Internet access provider, UT is 
clearly within the exemption. 
The purpose for CAN-SPAM lends further support for the presumption that a 
State actor can be considered an Internet access provider.  Congress, in enacting CAN-
SPAM, recognized the necessity for a uniform law with regard to email, especially 
 
50 15 U.S.C.S. § 7702(11) (West 2005) (importing the definition of an Internal access service wholesale 
from The Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. §231(e)(4) (held to be unconstitutional on procedural 
grounds).  There is seemingly no distinction between an Internet access provider and an Internet access 
service.  It should be noted that the Court of Appeals erroneously credits this definition to the Internet Tax 
Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151. 
51 White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 369. 
52 Id. at 373. 
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because emails are very often [HM13]interstate and there are jurisdictional problems 
imposed if different laws apply when the same email is sent to different states.  However, 
Congress also recognized that, “The problems associate[HM14]d with the rapid growth and 
abuse of unsolicited commercial electronic mail cannot be solved by Federal legislation 
alone.”53 It is reasonable to assume that the existence of the exemption clause stems from 
this recognition.  Those that provide Internet access necessarily need freedom in order to 
specifically tailor spam filters to their own users.  In light of Congress’ findings that 
email “has become an extremely important and popular means of communication, relied 
on by millions of Americans on a daily basis . . .”54 and that “[t]he convenience and 
efficiency of electronic mail are threatened by the extremely rapid growth in the volume 
of unsolicited commercial electronic mail,”55 it can be presumed that Congress intended 
to liberally grant entities the freedom to formulate their own spam policies as an Internet 
access provider. 
Finally, the provision in § 7707(b)(2), which states that “State laws not specific to 
electronic mail, including State trespass, contract, or tort law” are not preempted by 
CAN-SPAM favors an interpretation supporting a State’s right to regulate spam.  The 
District Court held that UT’s policy was not exempted because “it regulates all forms of 
solicitation.”56 The Court of Appeals, in its decision, declined to address this issue 
“because [it] had alternate grounds of making [its] preemption decision.”57 However, 
 
53 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701(a)(12) (West 2005). 
54 15 U.S.C.S. §7701(a)(1) (West 2005). 
55 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701(2) (West 2005). 
56 White Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. of Tex., No. A-03-CA-296-SS, 2004 WL 1854168 at *3 (W.D.Tex. Mar. 
22, 2004), aff’d, 420 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2005). 
57 Id. at *4 n.12. 
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rather than leave this discussion for another day, the Court of Appeals could have easily 
provided an answer to this issue[HM15].
Under CAN-SPAM, state laws that are not specific to electronic mail, or that 
regulate acts of fraud or computer crime, are not subject to preemption under the Act.58 
However, there[HM16] is some question as to whether the policies of a state university have 
the requisite weight to be considered a “state law.”59 In its decision, the Court of Appeals 
summarily rejects an argument that UT’s anti-spam policy is not a “statute, regulation, or 
rule of a State . . . .”60 To spell this out, first, it is well established that UT is 
encompassed by the term “State.”61 Second, the document that houses the University’s 
anti-spam policy, the Regents Rules, clearly indicates that the policy is part of a “rule of a 
State[HM17].”  However, the pertinent portion of CAN-SPAM uses the word “law.”62 For 
argument’s sake, I will proceed with this discussion under the assumption that a statute, 
regulation, or rule, falls under the Act’s definition of “law.”[HM18] 
The issue can be summarized as follows:  Absent a finding that UT is an 
I[HM19]nternet access provider, would its policy be exempted because it is a “State law not 
specific to electronic mail?”63 The pertinent part of UT’s Rules and Regulations is found 
in Part One, Chapter VI Section 6.6 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Regents 
of the University of Texas System for the Government of the University of Texas System 
 
58 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(2) (West 2005). 
59 The District Court may have confused this issue by questioning whether the spam policy itself can be 
considered a “statute, regulation, or rule.”  However, the spam policy was promulgated only in conjunction 
with UT’s general anti-solicitation policy as laid out in the Regents Rules.  The Regents Rules themselves 
clearly fall within the category of a “statute, regulation, or rule.” 
60 White Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. of Tex., 420 F.3d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating “Any suggestion 
along the lines . . . that an ITC policy does not constitute a policy of a state subdivision -  is incorrect and 
requires little explanation.  ITC implements the directive of, and operates pursuant to the authority of, the 
Board of Regents; its policies therefore constitute rules of a state subdivision.”) (emphasis added). 
61 In fact, this issue is so well established that UT itself conceded that it was a state actor.  Statement 
Regarding Oral Argument, White Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. of Tex., No. 04 - 50362 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2004). 
62 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(2) (West 2005). 
63 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(2)(A) (West 2005). 
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(“Regents Rules”). [HM20] The Regents Rules defines “solicitation” as “the sale, lease, 
rental or offer for sale, lease, rental of any property, product, merchandise, publication, or 
service, whether for immediate or future delivery . . . .”64 Although the precise nature of 
the email sent by White Buffalo is not in the record, it is presumed that the email 
contained an offer for the sale of dating services.  Therefore, the email is covered under 
UT’s anti-solicitation policy.  It can hardly be said that this policy is specific to email.  
The Regents Rules do not specifically mention email, or even the Internet, in setting out 
its anti-solicitation rules.  Therefore, the Regents Rules set out a broad anti-solicitation 
policy.  The pertinent portion of CAN-SPAM states, “This chapter shall not be construed 
to preempt the applicability of  -- (A) State laws that are not specific to electronic mail, 
including State trespass, contract, or tort law.”65 While the mention of “State trespass, 
contract, or tort law” may indicate that Congress had specific fields of law that CAN-
SPAM was not meant to affect, the statute’s actual language only states that these areas 
of law are “included” among those not preempted, but not that they are the exclusive 
areas. 
This analysis is especially pertinent because the inapplicability of CAN-SPAM to 
UT’s anti-spam policy under this situation opens the door for practically any State actor 
to escape preemption under CAN-SPAM simply by using a broad anti-solicitation policy 
to shield what is essentially an anti-spam policy.  It is hard to imagine that Congress 
foresaw the situation at hand - a university’s anti-spam policy escaping preemption 
because it is encompassed in their general anti-solicitation policy.  The failure of the 
 
64 UT Bd. of Regents’ Rules & Regs., Pt. One, Ch. VI, “Student Services and Activities and Regulations on 
Facilities Use,” § 6.6 “Solicitation” (emphasis added) (last amended 11/13/03) (superseded by New Rules 
12/10/04). 
65 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(2)(A) (West 2005). 
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Court to address this issue can lead to a potential expansion of the exemption for State 
actors to every State entity.   
It may be that the wording of CAN-SPAM is important after all.  While the above 
analysis proceeded on the assumption that the Regents Rules would be incorporated 
under the heading “state law”, the wording of CAN-SPAM may indicate that Congress 
did in fact intend to limit the policies that could escape preemption.  The section of CAN-
SPAM that outlines the general preemption rules states, “This chapter supersedes any 
statute, regulation, or rule of a State   . . . .”66 However, the section that discusses what 
CAN-SPAM will not affect reads:  
(2) State law not specific to electronic mail 
This chapter shall not be construed to preempt the applicability of --  
(A) State laws that are not specific to electronic mail, including State trespass, 
contract, or tort law; or
(B) other State laws to the extent that those laws relate to acts of fraud or 
computer crime.67 
The word “law” or “laws” is used four times in this section of CAN-SPAM, and there is 
no indication that a State “rule” would be sufficient.  [HM21]The inclusion of the word 
“rules” in the preceding section outlining what CAN-SPAM preempts, and the absence of 
the word “rules” in the section outlining what is exempted from preemption, leads to the 
inference that “rules” are not sufficient for purposes of the latter section.  While this word 
choice may have been an unintentional one, Congress may have more likely intended 
only “laws,” which presumably are more difficult to enact than “rules,” [HM22]to escape 
preemption under certain situations.  Applying such an interpretation, the Regents Rules, 
 
66 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(1) (West 2005) (emphasis added). 
67 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(2) (West 2005) (emphases added). 
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which the Court of Appeals characterized as “rules of a state subdivision,” would not 
qualify for exemption from preemption.68 
The above analysis shows that much depends on how the words of CAN-SPAM are 
interpreted.  On one hand, an interpretation that exempts from preemption a policy such 
as UT’s ITC[HM23] policy could result in similar consequences for many of the State’s 
policies.  On the other hand, an interpretation that does not include policies, and limits 
what can be exempted from preemption, would prevent a State entity like UT from 
regulating [HM24]solicitation broadly in the hopes of reaching email solicitation as well.  
While it is my [HM25]opinion that the words chosen by Congress are meant to include only 
State laws, perhaps the Court will one day have cause to address this issue and decide 
which interpretation is the correct one. 
B. Commercial free speech.[HM26] 
Having determined that UT’s policy fits under the exemption for Internet access 
providers, the Court then turned its analysis to White Buffalo’s First Amendment 
freedom of commercial speech claim.  The resolution of this issue requires application of 
the four-part test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
447 U.S. 557 (1980), the seminal case in determining the legality of commercial speech 
regulation.69[HM27] However, the Court of Appeals’ application of this test is problematic 
in the same way that much of its analysis of this case is in that their holding lacks the 
clarity and discussion that would help decisions of future cases.[HM28] 
68 It is also important to note that 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(2) only refers to “State” and not to political 
subdivisions of State.  Again, it is unclear whether this choice was intentional or unintentional, but the 
more likely interpretation is that the choice is intentional and only laws promulgated by the State are 
included. 
69 The four part test looks to:  1) Is the speech at issue lawful or misleading?, 2) Does the government have 
a substantial interest in regulation?, 3) Does the state’s action directly promote the interest?, and 4) Is the 
state action more extensive than necessary to promote the state interest.  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
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1.  Is the speech lawful or misleading? 
The first part of the Central Hudson test focuses on whether the speech is lawful 
and not misleading.  While this issue is answered easily in that both parties admit that 
White Buffalo’s email was both lawful and not misleading, this is somewhat of an 
anomaly with respect to most forms of spam.  
Most spam messages contain some form of falsity, whether it be in the “from” 
lines, “subject” lines, or text.70 An interesting issue arises when trying to determine how 
much the spam must mislead the recipient in order to put the target of legislation outside 
of the purview of commercial free speech.  While a discussion on this issue would have 
been dicta in the context of an analysis of the case at bar, a discussion would nonetheless 
have given valuable guidance for future courts in deciding commercial free speech cases. 
The location of the misleading data may be dispositive to this issue.  Central 
Hudson, in creating the threshold question of whether a message is false or misleading, 
stated, “Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of 
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.  The 
government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to 
inform it.”71 If the basis for excluding misleading advertisements is to safeguard the 
public from misinformation, how misleading must the “subject” line, “from” line, or text 
be in order to be excluded?  While it is most likely easier to omit a message from 
commercial free speech protections based on misinformation in the body of the text, 
which is more akin to false advertisement, issues may arise when evaluating the degree of 
 
70 Fed. Trade Comm’n, False Claims in Spam 10 (Apr. 30, 200), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/spam/030429spamreport.pdf (stating that sixty - six percent of spam analyzed 
by the Federal Trade Commission contained some form of falsity). 
71 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). 
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misinformation required in the “subject” line or “from” line.  One court has held that a 
subject line stating, “Did I get the right e-mail address?” when the body of the text was an 
advertisement, was sufficiently misleading to bar the sender from the protections of First 
Amendment Commercial Free Speech.72 This subject line is somewhat misleading 
because the sender is most likely attempting to get the recipient to read the email because 
of the connotation of a prior relationship.  However, if the test is whether or not the 
message is “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it,” it can be argued that 
such a subject line can better inform the public.  Because most people are likely to delete 
emails from senders they do not recognize, a subject line that catches the eye and entices 
the recipient to open it can better inform the recipient about possible transaction 
opportunities, amongst other things, provided the body of the text itself is not misleading 
or fraudulent.  A narrow reading of “misleading,” such as that adopted by the Court of 
Appeals of Washington[HM29] in State v. Heckel, can severely hinder the rights of 
legitimate advertisers who may want to be a bit more creative [HM30]in crafting subject 
lines. 
To resolve this issue, the courts should look first to the body of the text to 
determine if it is misleading.  Absent a finding of a fraudulent, or of course unlawful, 
advertisement in the body, the courts should then turn to the “from” and/or “subject” 
lines to determine the effect of the misinformation, if any, in these lines in determining 
whether an email fails the threshold test of the Central Hudson four-prong model[HM31].
2.  Does the government have a substantial interest in the regulation? 
The second test of Central Hudson examines whether the government’s expressed 
interest in the regulation is substantial.  In its brief, UT argued that it had two primary 
 
72 State v. Heckel, 122 Wash. App. 60, 71 (Ct. App. WA. 2004). 
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interests worthy of being defined as “substantial” - time and interests of those with UT 
email accounts, and the efficiency of its networks and servers. 
While the Central Hudson test looks to the government interest, the issue in this 
case is that of a state university.  The interests of such a limited governmental entity are 
potentially much narrower than the interest of the entire state.  However, in this case, the 
interests of the smaller entity, the state university’s board of regents, and the larger entity, 
the state government as a whole, are similar if not the same, and the following analysis 
assumes that the interests are the same. 
With regard to the time and interest of email users, the Court states, “For purposes 
of evaluating the summary judgment, we acknowledge as substantial the government’s 
gatekeeping interest in protecting users of its email network from the hassle associate 
with unwanted spam.”73 This conclusory statement [HM32]gives no guidance as to why the 
time and interests of the email users is a “substantial” government interest.74 In fact, 
those that send “spam” can argue that their messages are not any different from other 
annoyances in life[HM33]. While most spam is typically irrelevant or unhelpful to the 
recipient, spam can also provide for “transaction opportunities that otherwise would not 
occur due to prohibitive search costs or lack of consumer awareness about products 
available to solve their needs.”75 A further description of what this “hassle” is would 
have provided more guidance for this analysis, but absent this, I turn to what these 
“hassle[s]” typically refer to.   
 
73 White Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. of Tex., 420 F.3d 366, 374-75 (5th Cir. 2005). 
74 In the Court’s defense, more analysis is not required in evaluating a summary judgment. 
75 Eric Goldman, Where’s the Beef? Dissecting Spam’s Purported Harms, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 13, 16 (2003). 
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Loss of productivity and time are frequently reasons cited in condemning spam.  
However, it could be argued that spam saves email users time, if the messages are 
pertinent.  A quick perusal of subject headings, provided the subjects are accurate, can 
tell an email user whether or not the email is of any value to them.  Deleting irrelevant 
emails takes a matter of seconds and if emails pertaining to goods and services that the 
email user has been thinking about consuming remain, reading these emails can provide 
potential money-saving offers and information for comparative pricing. [HM34] 
Also, spam is not unlike many other forms of advertisement.  People are 
inundated with advertisements, whether watching television, reading a magazine, or even 
driving down the freeway.  Yet in these other contexts, people are willing to wade 
through the advertisements, or simply ignore them.  If the reason for regulating spam is to 
save people time, does the government have a similar “substantial” interest in ridding 
people of advertisements altogether?  Of course, there is more at issue in examining the 
harm of spam.  This discussion is meant only to illustrate that the Court’s dismissal of 
this issue by pronouncing an interest in protecting people from “hassle” is not nearly 
enough to prove a “substantial” interest. 
I do agree with the Court that UT has a substantial interest in protecting its email 
users from spam messages.  First, UT has an interest in protecting its users from wasted 
time.  Although, as argued above, spam messages can provide some benefits to email 
users, if spam messages are allowed to reach the UT email users unchecked, the loss of 
productivity and time would be crippling.76 Furthermore, if the UT email users’ accounts 
 
76 The District Court, citing to a 2003 Ferris Research report, stated that “employee productivity losses 
from sifting through and deleting spam account[ed] for nearly $4 billion.”  White Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. 
of Tex., No. A-03-CA-296-SS, 2004 WL 1854168 at *5 (W.D.Tex. Mar. 22, 2004), aff’d, 420 F.3d 366 (5th 
Cir. 2005). 
19
are continuously filled with spam messages, the users are more likely to become 
frustrated and discontinue use of their accounts, thereby negating a benefit that the 
University intended to offer those affiliated with it.  UT has a substantial interest in 
protecting those affiliated with the University, and to ensure their time and efforts are not 
consumed searching through emails to find the messages pertinent to them.   
The Court similarly handles the “server efficiency” interest advanced by UT, 
simply stating, “Also substantial is the ‘server efficiency’ interest . . . .”77 Again, this 
language provides no guidance for future decisions.  With regard to this issue, a complete 
analysis would save time [HM35]by providing valuable precedent.  While the volume of 
emails sent by a spammer such as White Buffalo Ventures may vary, the interest of each 
State actor in protecting the efficiency of its server is likely to be very similar [HM36]for 
each State actor.  That which constitutes a burden on server efficiency should not be 
based solely on the volume of emails sent because this would lead to potentially 
nonsensical line drawing[HM37]. Therefore, a determination of whether or not the server 
efficiency interest is a substantial one would save significant time in the future[HM38].
The server issue is perhaps an easier one to determine than the user efficiency 
argument.  It has been held that there is a substantial state interest in the protection of its 
servers.  If the servers are overloaded by spam to the point that they no longer function, 
the state’s email, and perhaps other Internet services, will be halted.  Therefore, a 
substantial interest exists. 
3.  Does the state’s action directly promote the interest? 
The Court [HM39] holds that UT’s policy is clearly directed to promote their interest 
in both user efficiency and server efficiency[HM40]. The policy of blocking unwanted 
 
77 White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 375. 
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spam serves only [HM41]the purpose of saving email users’ time and frees the UT servers 
from overloading on emails.  In fact, the Court itself stated, “One can hardly imagine a 
more direct means of preventing commercial spam from appearing in account-holders’ 
inboxes and occupying server space than promulgating a policy that excludes such 
material from the email network.”78 
4. Is the state action more extensive than necessary to promote the interest?   
 
The Court has no problem in holding that the policy is no more extensive than 
necessary to safeguard user efficiency, but declines holding that the policy is no more 
extensive than necessary to protect server efficiency.  Although the Court’s analysis of 
this considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant because it is 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, there are discrepancies in the analysis with 
regards to user efficiency versus the analysis with regards to server efficiency. 
First, the Court concludes that UT’s ITC policy is no more extensive than 
necessary because blocking unwanted spam “keep[s] community members from wasting 
time identifying, deleting, and blocking” the unwanted messages.79 This statement seems 
to suggest that the degree to which the users are protected is not at issue.  The ITC policy 
is no more extensive than necessary because it fulfills its goal of preventing wasted time.  
However, in looking at the server efficiency issue, the Court does not begin and end its 
analysis at whether the policy fulfills its stated goal of protecting server efficiency.  As a 
matter of common sense, the ITC policy would fulfill the goal of protecting server 
efficiency – if the server does not have to process White Buffalo’s email, its efficiency is 
improved.  If an analysis of the degree to which the efficiency is protected is not 
 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 376. 
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warranted, as it was not in examining user efficiency, then UT prevails on this issue as 
well.  Arguing this issue may be moot in that “a governmental entity may assert that a 
statute serves multiple interests, and only one of those need be substantial.”80 However, 
it is confusing why the Court feels the need to further analyze the server efficiency issue 
while at the same time summarily dismissing the user efficiency issue. 
The Court stated that “the challenged regulation should indicate that its proponent 
‘carefully calculated the costs and benefits associate with the burden on speech imposed 
by its prohibition.’”81 If this is in fact the rule that is to be followed, there is no issue in 
applying it to the server efficiency interest that UT advances.  However, there is no 
indication that such careful calculation was made when examining the user efficiency 
interest advanced by UT.  The costs of UT’s ITC policy are the same, whether the policy 
is used to advance user efficiency or server efficiency.  Regardless as to which interest is 
at issue, the cost is the blocking of otherwise legal commercial emails.  If a difference 
exists, it must be in the “benefits associate with the burden on speech.”82[HM42] 
When examining user efficiency, the benefit that accrues to UT is the amount of 
time saved by protecting UT email account holders from White Buffalo’s unwanted 
email.  Although this could add up to hours [HM43]in the aggregate, when considering the 
amount of time saved by all UT email account holders combined, each user individually 
is only minimally benefited by UT blocking White Buffalo’s spam.83 After all, it takes a 
matter of seconds for a reader to look at the sender or subject line of the email and 
 
80 Id. at 378, citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-73 (1983). 
81 White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 376-77, quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 
410, 417 (1993). 
82 Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993). 
83 The Court makes it very clear that only the benefit accrued in blocking White Buffalo’s spam can be 
considered, and no the effect of spam “taken in its entirety.”  White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 376. 
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determine it is not an email they are interested in.84 The benefit accrued to UT in 
protecting its servers is increased efficiency.  The emails sent by White Buffalo, or any 
other spammer, take up disc space and drain processing power.  These resources are 
therefore unavailable to process the requests of other UT users.85[HM44] The number of 
emails sent by White Buffalo, estimated at 55,000, is unlikely to significantly affect the 
UT servers, and therefore the benefit to server efficiency is probably not significant.  
However, for the above reasons, the benefit to user efficiency is likewise not significant.  
Therefore, another reason must exist to explain the distinction the Court makes between 
evaluating user efficiency and server efficiency. 
The Court, expresses reticence in “declaring server integrity to be a substantial 
interest without evidentiary substantiation” because there might be “unforeseen and 
undesirable ramifications in other online contexts.”86 In a footnote, the Court, after 
warning that it is no more than a “cautionary note,” explains that there is a danger that 
courts will conclude that there is a burden on a system without requiring evidence or 
explanation as to how the system is burdened.87 The Court cites to a number of cases in 
which such a scenario came to fruition.88 However, if the Court is simply willing to 
accept, without evidence or explanation, a burden on user efficiency, the same dangers 
exist.  In this case, the Court ultimately granted summary judgment to UT based on its 
user efficiency interest alone.  After this holding, a government entity need only advance 
 
84 Although the veracity of the subject and/or sender lines may be an issue in other cases, it was conceded 
that White Buffalo’s email contained “factually accurate information.”  Id. at 374.  Therefore, a quick 
perusal of this subject and/or sender line would give accurate information to the recipient, who would then 
be able to make a quick decision as to whether or not to open the email. 
85 See CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
86 White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 377.  
87 Id. at 377 n. 24.   
88 See e.g. CompuServe, 962 F.Supp. at 1022, Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F.Supp.2d 548, 550 
(E.D.Va.1998), Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 1998 WL 388389, ¶ 34 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 16, 1998). 
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a user efficiency interest, and attach or even forego the server efficiency interest, and the 
outcome will be a grant of summary judgment.  If the Court really wanted to prevent 
other courts from deciding the issue of burden on a state interest without support of 
evidence or explanation, more scrutiny should have been given to the user efficiency 
interest advanced by UT. 
The court completely declined to address the “dicey but admittedly important 
question of the public versus private forum status of public university email servers.”89 
Before examining whether a public university’s email server is a public or private 
forum, it is important to first understand what constitutes a public forum.  In Perry 
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators Association,90 the Supreme Court 
outlined a “tripartite forum-based framework to analyze First Amendment issues 
involving governmentally-owned property.”91 The first category includes “places which 
by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.”92 
This first category is considered “quintessential public forums.”93 The second category 
includes “public property which the state has opened for use by the public as a place for 
expressive activity.”94 The third category includes “[p]ublic property which is not by 
tradition or designation a forum for public communication.”95 Essentially, anything that 
does not fit into the first two categories falls into this third category.  
 
89 White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 374 n.15.  
90 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
91 Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 9, White Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. of Tex., No. 04-50362 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 
2004). 
92Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 46.  Although the Supreme Court does not label it as such, this third category is what will be 
referred to as a private forum. 
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The difference between a public forum and a private one is important because 
different restrictions can be applied depending on which forum the email server 
constitutes.  If the server is deemed to be a public forum, then the university may impose 
“[r]easonable time, place and manner regulations . . . and a content-based prohibition 
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.”96 However, if the 
server is a private forum, “In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the state 
may reserve the forum for its intended purposes . . . as long as the regulation on speech is 
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials 
oppose the speaker's view.”97 
While neither the Supreme Court nor any court in the Fifth Circuit has ruled on 
whether a university’s email server constitutes a public or private forum, decisions by the 
Supreme Court concerning what does constitute a private forum can, by comparison, help 
determine how the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals should have ruled with regard to this 
issue.  In Perry, the issue was whether a school’s internal mail system was public forum.  
An educators’ association sued the Perry school board and teachers’ union after it was 
denied access to the internal mail system.98 While conceding that the internal mail 
system’s purpose was to facilitate communication matters amongst teachers, and not for 
use by the public, the educators’ association tried to argue that the mail system was a 
"limited public forum."99 The teachers’ association position was that it could not be 
excluded “because of the periodic use of the system by private non-school-connected 
 
96 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981). 
97 United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981). 
98 Perry, 460 U.S. at 41. 
99 Id. at 47. 
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groups.”100 The court, however, rejected the teachers’ association’s argument.  While 
stating, “[U]se of the internal school mail by groups not affiliated with the schools is no 
doubt a relevant consideration,” the court also pointed to the fact that use by non-
affiliated groups was not indiscriminate.101 For a non-affiliated group to use the internal 
mail system, they must ask for permission from the school’s principal.  The educators’ 
association failed to do this.  The court held, “This type of selective access does not 
transform government property into a public forum.”102 Due to the nature of the forum, 
the court upheld the school’s use of the internal mail system and their restriction of the 
educators’ association’s use of the system.  In so holding, the court stated: 
Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in 
access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These distinctions may 
be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the process 
of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose 
of the property.103 
UT provides email accounts to its faculty, staff, and students.  The messages are 
stored on UT’s servers.  The email accounts at issue here are comparable to a mail box in 
an internal mail system in that mail is sent to the “owner” of the mail box.104 Like in 
Perry, UT’s email account can still be used for communication by non-school affiliated 
groups.  Also like Perry, UT can allow selective access to the use of its system.  
Although the form of selection is slightly different, in Perry the school allows use of the 





103 Id. at 49. 
104 It is interesting to note that White Buffalo, in its brief, erroneously calls the Perry mail system an email 
system.  Furthermore, appellant states that Perry’s “email” system was restricted for business purposes.  
This was not the holding of the case.  The similarities between a physical mail box and email account 
necessitate further discussion of whether they are comparable.  Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, White 
Buffalo Ventures v. Univ. of Tex., No. 04-50362 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2004). 
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filters to block certain strings, the difference flows necessarily from the nature of physical 
mail versus use of the Internet.  Since the Internet and email are more widely used 
vehicles of communication, and are free of charge as compared to the requirement of paid 
postage for “snail mail,” the screening measures employed to block emails serve the 
function of preventing email account from an inundation of messages.   
However, there is an important difference between the Perry mail box and the UT 
email account that creates difficulties in the comparison between the two.  While the 
purpose of the Perry mail system was to “facilitate communication matters amongst 
teachers,”105 the UT email service is not so limited in its purpose.  In fact, communication 
amongst members of the school is almost an incidental use of the email service.  Holders 
of an email account may receive emails from any number of people, including those 
affiliated with the school.  Therefore, the UT email account is easily distinguishable from 
the Perry internal mail system.  The question still remains whether UT allows enough 
access to email that it should be considered a public forum.   
It is safe to say that the email accounts and the network system used to transmit 
and store the messages, are not a quintessential public forum.  For one, there is not a 
“long standing tradition” of email use.  The advent and widespread use of this form of 
communication is in its relative youth.  However, even absent this weak temporal 
argument, it cannot be said that email has a tradition of use as a forum for assembly and 
debate.  Although, to be sure, email can be used as a vehicle for debate, its principle use 
is for private communication between parties.  Therefore, UT’s email accounts do not fit 
within the first category of public fora. 
 
105 Perry, 460 U.S. at 47. 
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UT’s email system does not fit into the second category of public fora either.  The 
second category includes “public property which the state has opened for use by the 
public as a place for expressive activity.”106 The argument is defeated in that the email 
system is not “public property.”  UT correctly argues that it does not offer email accounts 
to the general public, but only to those who are properly affiliated with the school.  Since 
the accounts are not available to the general public, they can hardly be considered to be 
available for the general public for “expressive activity.”107 Although the email accounts 
may be used by certain members of the public for expressive activity, especially when 
account holders request such information, “selective access does not transform 
government property into a public forum.”108 
Applying the categories outlined in Perry, it would seem that UT’s email network 
falls into category three.109 There is some support for the categorization of a public 
university’s email system as a private forum.  The District Court for the Western District 
of Oklahoma held that the University of Oklahoma (OU)’s server was a non-public 
forum.110 In its decision, the court highlighted the fact that, “[a] university is by its 
nature dedicated to research and academic purposes.”111 Therefore, “[t]he limitation of 
OU Internet services to research and academic purpose . . .  is not a violation of the First 
Amendment, in that those purposes are the very ones for which the system was 
purchased.”112 The Loving court also pointed to the fact that there was “no evidence . . . 
that the facilities [had] ever been open to the general public or used for public 
 
106 Id. at 45. 
107 Id.
108 Id. at 41. 
109 The rule from Perry is that those fora that do not fit into the first two categories instead fall into the 
third.  Id. at 46. 




communication.”113 Loving lends support to UT’s position because, like OU, UT has 
purchased computers and has put a network in place of use by its students and faculty 
only.  There is no evidence that the system has ever been open to the general public or 
used for public communication.  This network can be used to serve a research and 
academic purpose but, like the OU news server, the email system can also be used for a 
non-research and/or academic purpose.  The similarities between access to OU’s news 
servers and UT’s email system support a conclusion that UT’s email network should be 
considered a private forum.  
Under the above analysis, UT’s email system is a private forum, and thus, the 
University may reserve the forum for its intended purpose.  While UT does not 
specifically state what the intended purpose of its email system is, presumably the use is 
for communication with the students, and to provide the students with a means of 
communicating both with school affiliated and non-school affiliated persons. 
Whether the email system is a public or private forum can serve as a threshold 
question for future cases because the analysis is different depending on what kind of 
forum is at issue.  The less stringent requirements of a private forum will allow greater 
regulation of the forum’s use.  It is curious that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, instead 
of addressing this issue first, chooses to skip analysis of the forum at issue and toil 
through a Central Hudson analysis instead.  The reason for this could be hesitance on the 
part of the court to create new precedent, instead relying on the tried and true formula of 
Central Hudson. Whether this reticence is the reason for passing on the issue or not is 
questionable.  However, Central Hudson would still play an important role in 
 
113 Id.  
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determining whether a public forum’s regulation was constitutional and court’s would 
have ample opportunity to continue application of this test.   
By settling this issue the Court of Appeals could have made their job easier.  For 
instance, in this case, the Court could have used the public versus private forum issue as a 
threshold question.  Under my own analysis, the UT email network is a private forum, 
and thus the policy adopted by UT passes constitutional muster.  Should the court still 
wish to apply Central Hudson, it would be free to do so to support the holding with an 
alternative means.   
IV.  CONCLUSION. 
In examining the preemption language of CAN-SPAM, it is clear that Congress 
intended to expressly preempt all state laws.  However, Congress also included an 
exemption for both Internet access provider and for State laws not specific to electronic 
mail.  The Court ultimately held that UT was an Internet access provider, and therefore, 
its ITC policy was not preempted by CAN-SPAM.  Although the District Court also 
analyzed the UT ITC policy as a State law not specific to electronic mail, it is more likely 
that the Regents Rules encompassing the ITC policy do not rise to the level of a State 
law, as contemplated by Congress in drafting CAN-SPAM. 
In addition to surviving preemption by CAN-SPAM, UT’s ITC policy must also 
pass Constitutional muster.  UT offered two interests served by the ITC policy.  The 
Court, after applying a Central Hudson analysis, held that the policy did pass muster with 
regards to UTs interest in user efficiency, but not with regards to server efficiency.  
Although the holding with regards to server efficiency is fleshed out, the reason why user 
efficiency is acceptable, while server efficiency is not, is not clearly explained.  It would 
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seem that the Court should apply an all-or-nothing approach – either both are acceptable 
interests, or neither are. 
Finally, while the Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether UT’s 
email system constitutes a public or private fora, a comparison to existing case law leads 
to the conclusion that UT’s email system is a private forum, and therefore, UT may 
reserve the system for its intended use. 
In reviewing the holding of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, I find that I agree 
with much of the Court’s holding.  My quarrel with the Court stems from the fact that 
they leave much of the analysis, instead, for another day, or for the dubious machinations 
of law school students in scholarly writings. 
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